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Abstract The impacts of climate change on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are leading to dis-
cussions regarding decision-making about the potential need to migrate. Despite the situation being
well-documented, with many SIDS aiming to raise the topic to prominence and to take action for them-
selves, limited support and interest has been forthcoming from external sources. This paper presents,
analyzes, and critiques a decision-making ﬂowchart to support actions for SIDS dealing with climate
change-linked migration. The ﬂowchart contributes to identifying the pertinent topics to consider and
the potential support needed to implement decision-making.
The ﬂowchart has signiﬁcant limitations and there are topics which it cannot resolve. On-the-ground con-
siderations include who decides, ﬁnances, implements, monitors,and enforces each decision. Additionally,
views within communities diﬀer, hence mechanisms are needed for dealing with diﬀerences, while issues
to address include moral and legal blame for any climate change-linked migration, the ultimate goal of
the decision-making process, the wider role of migration in SIDS communities and the right to judge
decision-making and decisions. The conclusions summarize the paper, emphasizing the importance of
considering contexts beyond climate change and multiple SIDS voices.
1. Introduction
The Small Island Developing States (SIDS; http://www.sidsnet.org) are several dozen countries and territo-
ries which have joined together through the United Nations to tackle sustainability challenges [UN, 1994,
2005, 2014]. One major sustainability challenge for SIDS is climate change, for which migration seems to
be a likely outcome in several SIDS as ecosystems change, as freshwater supplies are aﬀected and as the
sea level rises [Barnett and Campbell, 2010; IPCC, 2013–2014; Kelman and West, 2009]. Despite the climate
change challenges being well-known and many SIDS aiming to take action for themselves, limited sup-
port and interest have come from external sources. That is true even for the possible impacts on migration
destinations, in terms of little in-depth interest from non-SIDS peoples for dealing with the challenge and
opportunityofpotentialmigration,andfordevelopingdecision-makingprocessesfordecidingif,whenand
how to migrate from SIDS.
Thisarticleproposesandexaminesadecision-makingframeworkforSIDSregardingclimatechange-linked
migration. The framework is presented and critiqued to examine the pertinent concerns and reso-
lutions related to the decision-making, to determine how SIDS peoples could be supported in their
decision-making and to indicate what SIDS peoples require in order to further help themselves. The next
section summarizes climate change-linked migration from SIDS and consequent issues. Section 3 uses
this background material to provide a decision-making ﬂowchart with section 4 indicating topics which
the ﬂowchart cannot resolve. The conclusions summarize the paper, emphasizing the importance of
considering contexts beyond climate change and multiple SIDS voices.
2. Climate Change-Linked Migration for SIDS
Muchrhetoriconclimatechange-linkedmigrationconstructsitasbeingathreatfrommassesofpoorpeo-
ple ﬂeeing their angry environment, epitomized in the ﬁlm Climate Refugees [2010] by Michael Nash. The
ﬁlm’s main downfall is aiming to frighten the viewer about migrants.Dramatic red arrows leap from poorer
countries to converge on richer locales. Accompanying commentary decries that “our” children might die
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ﬁghtingtoprotect“us”from“them”.Withoutanycritiqueorevidence,conceptsof“NationalSecurity”frame
the ﬁlm, presumably to appeal to American patriotism.
Bettini [2013], Hartmann [2010], and Nicholson [2014] deconstruct such discourse. They argue that it plays
into the hands of those who wish to securitize and militarize the topic of migration, seeking an excuse
to create confrontation and fear in order to support melodramatic, militaristic measures for stemming the
mythical ﬂows of helpless people. They also point to little empirical evidence that masses of people will
suddenly migrate due to climate change, suggesting that the idea of “climate refugees” is politically con-
structed.ForSIDSspeciﬁcally,authorssuchasFarbotko[2010],McNamara[2009]andMcNamaraandGibson
[2009] garner viewpoints from the countries of potential migrants. They demonstrate how many islanders
accept the likelihood—perhaps inevitability—of moving due to climate change, but they do not wish to
be labeled as “refugees”. They would instead prefer to have the international support to implement any
needed movement on their own terms in their own way.
Regardingthepossibilitiesofviolentconﬂictemergingfromclimatechange-linkedmigration,Salehyanand
Gleditsch[2006]reviewandsuggestpathwaysthroughwhichrefugeescouldincreasethechanceofviolent
conﬂict;however,pre-existingviolenceexistsinthesecases.Thosemigratingduetoclimatechangearenot
refugees under international law, are not moving due to violent conﬂict and are not expected to be mov-
ing into volatile areas. Raleigh etal. [2008] analyze the potential for violence from climate change-linked
migration, concluding within numerous provisos that the nature of the migration expected from climate
change would limit the prospects for violent conﬂict. Dovetailing with Hartmann’s [2010] work, it appears
as if the evidence currently available regarding violent conﬂict from climate change-linked migration is
contested [see also IPCC, 2013–2014]. These points do not eliminate possibilities for political tension, per-
hapsevenviolentconﬂict,emergingfrommigration.Instead,theyindicatethatnoreasonexiststoassume
the inevitability of negative or violent reactions while questioning why some discussions present climate
change-linked migration as being naturally and inevitably conﬂictual.
Nor do the critiques deny the seriousness of the situation and the need to consider migration as a strong
possibility. SIDS which might need to move their entire populations elsewhere due to climate change’s
consequences include Kiribati, Maldives, and Tuvalu. These actions would require negotiations with other
countries over where they should move, how they should resettle, and on what terms. For instance, on
manyPaciﬁcislands,almostallthelandisownedaccordingtotradition[Chapelle,1978].Acquiringsomeof
it for resettlement, such as on Fiji’s largest island Viti Levu, is not straightforward [ClarkeandJupiter, 2010].
Afterlong,drawn-outnegotiations,KiribatirecentlycompletedalandpurchasefromFiji,ostensiblytomove
because of climate change, but many unknowns remain in terms of whether or not that land is suitable
for resettling everyone from Kiribati, on top of the uncertainties regarding the need for and speed of any
migration.
Given these unknowns and uncertainties, what preparations ought to be started now? How could those
preparations be balanced with the need to avoid expending too many resources in case migration does
not manifest? When discussing the topic and beginning to plan and prepare, how is it possible to avoid
causing the aﬀected peoples to assume the inevitability of migration, but instead to keep it open as one
option among many? An assumption of migration could cause loss of hope for and lack of investment in
communities.
Manyleadersandscientistsfrompotentiallyaﬀectedcountriesandfromaroundtheworldhavebeenraising
such questions since the topic became politically prominent at the Small States Conference on Sea Level
Rise,heldfrom14–18November1989onMalé,thecapitalofMaldives(http://www.islandvulnerability.org/
slr1989.html). Much of the work and declarations from 1989 remain relevant today, suggesting that few
changeshaveresulted,despiteplentyofpublicationsonthetopicsincethen[Arnalletal.,2014;Barnettand
Campbell, 2010; GerrardandWannier, 2013; Kelman, 2010; YamamotoandEsteban, 2014].
Additionally, climate change-linked migration from SIDS did not start with humanity’s inﬂuence on the
atmosphere. Nunn [2000], Nunn and Britton [2001], and Nunn etal. [2007] document how changes to the
climateandsealevelinthefourteenthcenturyaroundthePaciﬁcledtocommunitiesdisappearing.Theevi-
denceisscarceregardingwhathappenedexactly,butitappearsasifmassmigrationwasoneconsequence
for some communities, rather than all the communities simply dying.
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SIDS communities evacuating is not about climate change only, thereby presenting some analogies which
could inform present-day approaches to climate change-linked migration. Volcanoes are particularly
common examples with entire island populations leaving suddenly or over a longer time period without
any certainty that return would be feasible. Examples are Niua Fo’ou in Tonga in 1946 [Lewis, 1979], Tristan
da Cunha in the South Atlantic in 1961 [de Boer and Sanders, 2002], Vestmannaeyjar in Iceland in 1973
[Chester, 1993] and Manam in Papua New Guinea in 2004 [Mercer and Kelman, 2010]. These communi-
ties’ experiences, especially regarding those who did and did not return, could help to prepare climate
change-threatened communities for migrating. Other reasons for island communities questioning their
own viability or resettling entire populations include the 26 December 2004 tsunamis after which com-
munities in Maldives were relocated [Sovacool, 2012]; residents of St. Kilda, Scotland being told in 1930
to abandon their islands and to resettle closer to the mainland [Steel, 2011]; and criminal charges related
to child abuse on Pitcairn Island, an Overseas Territory of the UK in the Paciﬁc, leading to questions about
continuing the community [Marks, 2008].
Inexamininganalogiesandprecedentstoinformcontemporarydiscussionofclimatechange-linkedmigra-
tion from SIDS, it is also important to recognize that not all contemporary SIDS movements are due to
climate change. The Lateu settlement in Vanuatu was forced to move in 2002–2004 as sea ﬂoods increas-
ingly encroached onto their village. Initial assumptions were that the ﬂooding occurred due to sea-level
rise, so those moving were presented in the media as being climate change “refugees”. Ballu etal. [2012]
showed that tectonic subsidence was more of a factor than sea-level rise, with the entire group of Torres
Islands in northern Vanuatu being aﬀected. The migration was not any less diﬃcult due to the underlying
cause, but it demonstrates that resettling SIDS communities should not be focused on the single topic of
climate change; it can draw on a variety of experiences and embrace wider contexts.
ThatshouldnotsidelineSIDSpeopleswhoaremovingexclusivelyduetoclimatechange.Examplesarefrom
Papua New Guinea, with communities in the Carteret Islands and Takuu Atoll moving involuntarily entirely
due to sea-level rise [Mercer, 2010; Strauss, 2012]. With diverse reasons for migrating, with precedents from
historyandwithcommunitiesmakingdecisionsforthemselveswhilerequestingexternalassistancewhich
israrelyforthcoming,furtherexaminingadecision-makingprocessformigrationcouldassistinunderstand-
ing if, when, and how to move entire island or country populations.
3. Decision-Making Flowchart
Figure 1 provides a decision-making ﬂowchart summarizing the topics raised in the previous section and
drawing on past experiences while integrating possible futures for SIDS. The ﬂowchart could be followed
by individuals, households, communities, islands, and countries.
Starting in Box (a) at the top left, a decision needs to be made to migrate or not to migrate. If that decision
is to migrate, then the timing for the movement needs to be determined. Should the islanders leave as
soonaspossibleasquicklyaspossible;shouldmigrationoveralongtimeperiodbeplanned;orwoulditbe
easier to wait for a major shift—such as a devastating cyclone or a collapse in ﬁsheries or crops—in order
to convince people to leave comparatively promptly? Boxes (b) and (c) illustrate some available choices
regarding the migration’s timing. Waiting for a disaster risks fatalities, injuries, psychological impacts, and
losses of tangible and intangible assets, for instance photographs and cultural heritage. Planning over the
long-termrisksamajorcalamityoccurringinthemeantime,convincingtheislanderstomigratebeforethey
are fully ready.
TheseconddecisiontobemadeisinBox(d):Developingapost-migrationcommunitywhichengageswith
the host communities. One option is Box (e), integrating entirely with other communities which entails
accepting the consequences of abandoning one’s identity, culture, and language. Many immigrants adopt
that approach, preferring to be as similar to their new home and hosts as possible. Others prefer to retain
aspects of their original values and culture. Considering a SIDS example, Tuvalu has approximately 12,000
people who could integrate and disperse in mega-cities such as Los Angeles, Sydney, or Tokyo. Few Tuval-
uans would be expected to wish for that, meaning that a mechanism for retaining identity is needed.
That suggests the pathway with Box (f): Re-building the original island community in such a way that as
much of the community’s culture is retained as feasible and as desirable, especially given that culture by
deﬁnition changes over time [Krügeretal., 2015]. Major changes due to the move are unavoidable leading
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(a) Decide to migrate 
rather than staying.
(b) Plan to leave 
before a major 
catastrophe.
(c) Wait until 
after a major 
catastrophe.
(d) Need to build a post-migration community.
(e) Integrate within an
existing community.
(f) Re-build the old 
community.
(g) Settle on existing 
land.
(h) Create new 
land.
(i) Decide on the level of 
sovereignty or autonomy.
Figure 1. Decision-making ﬂowchart.
to new elements in the culture. Yet desire to retain identity can be fulﬁlled to a large degree with planning
and resources. Two principal options exist.
First,Box(g),intermsofsettlingonexistingland,donatedbyorpurchasedfromanotherlocation.Asnoted
above, Kiribati has purchased land in Fiji while Maldives’ President from 2008 to 2012, at the beginning of
his presidency, highlighted one important goal as being to set aside funds for acquiring land in another
country [Kothari, 2014]. The second option is Box (h) in which new land is created in order to resettle the
migrants.
Creating artiﬁcial islands is technically feasible and is frequently enacted. The Spratly island of Layang
Layang in the South China Sea was artiﬁcially created by Malaysia through ﬁlling in the shallow sea
between two reefs in order to create a tourist resort. Hong Kong’s airport is built over two islands con-
nected by land reclamation. Dubai constructed the Palm Islands for a luxury residential and leisure area.
Since islands are being built for proﬁt, should resources be allocated to build islands for saving SIDS’
peoples, identities and countries? Islands could be built which are similar to the islanders’ original homes
but which would survive sea-level rise and other climate change impacts. That could be completed in
current SIDS territory. Maldives has pursued this approach, building the island of Hulhumalé, which is
attachedtotheislandwithMalé’sairport,inordertoprovidehomesandacommunityforpeoplewhowish
to live near the capital city.
Alternatively, islands could be built in entirely new places. Yamamoto and Esteban [2014] describe some
of the engineering options for constructing new islands, including prospects for ﬂoating islands which
are anchored to the seabed or to submerged islands. Kardol [1999] details some legal issues of building
artiﬁcial island states. Even more diﬃcult, with the potential of being even more legally contentious,
would be creating large mobile islands which would sail around the world’s seas as mobile sovereign
states.
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Forbuildingnewterritory,questionsexistregardingwhowouldpayforconstructionandmaintenance.Any
territorial disputes would need to be resolved, involving access to resources in the seas around the new
ﬁxed or mobile island. Nomadic peoples might have solid advice regarding how a population could adapt
to being mobile, even if that mobility were over water rather than roaming land, although many islanders
have traditions of long oceanic voyages. For islanders not used to nomadism, signiﬁcant cultural changes
would result as a consequence of creating mobile island states.
Irrespective of the choice of Box (g) or Box (h), the next challenge is Box (i) in terms of deciding the level
of autonomy or sovereignty for the resettled population. The main questions are regarding who makes,
monitors and enforces the decisions? Many SIDS peoples, quite rightly, do not wish to give up sovereignty
even if they must resettle. McNamara and Gibson [2009] describe how some diplomats from Paciﬁc island
countries are concerned that international discussions might be trying to force them to relinquish their
countries’ sovereignty if their peoples must move due to climate change impacts. Retaining sovereignty,
butmoreimportantlyensuringthattheislandersretaintherighttochoosetheirownsovereigntypathways,
might be the aspect that generates the most disagreements between migrants and hosts.
Complicationsariseindeterminingthedegreetowhichresettledislandershavetherighttoretainandman-
age their laws, justice system, language, education system and identity, whether sovereign or not. While
major cultural changes need to be expected, compromise between migrants and hosts—at both com-
munity and country levels—would be necessary including where the newly settled land was previously
uninhabited.
Many precedents and current examples exist to guide discussions. For justice, parallel and complementary
systems for indigenous peoples operate in Canada [e.g., Andersen, 1999; Baskin, 2002] and New Zealand
[e.g.,Goren,2001;GibbsandKing,2002].Formultiplemonetarysystemswithinthesamejurisdiction,barter
networks and local currencies operate around the world. Local Exchange Trading Systems, for instance in
Ithaca, New York [Crowther etal., 2002] and Skye, Scotland [Pacione, 1997], led to further social and eco-
nomicadvantagesespeciallyformoremarginalizedcommunities[Croall,1997;Williams,1996].Manyborder
towns, for example Niagara Falls, Ontario at the border with New York, oﬀer to transact business in either
currency—to be friendly and to avoid losses by exchanging money in banks. For education and language
training, parallel systems could be set up such as Ontario’s French immersion program and its Catholic
school system which also oﬀers Catholic French immersion schools [see Heller, 2003]. By emulating and
reﬁningsuchinitiatives,whichpermitsocietiestolivetogetherinthesamelocationwithdiﬀerencesinsec-
torssuchaseducationandjustice,migrantsandhostscouldcollaboratetocreateandmaintainnon-physical
or non-territorial states, or parts thereof.
Irrespectiveofhowmanyoftheislandgovernancesystemscouldbere-createdinnewterritories,migrating
andrebuildinginevitablychangescultureandidentity.Theislandersmightseekislandswhicharesimilarto
theiroriginalhomes,yetmoresecure.Onemajordiﬃcultyisthatalllow-lyingareascouldexperiencesimilar
climate change impacts with respect to sea-level rise. Meanwhile, many prospective candidates, such as
NewZealand’sKermadecIslandsorAustralia’sGreatBarrierReefislands,arealreadydesignatedorprotected
as scientiﬁc sites, natural and/or cultural heritage areas, or (with examples from Maldives) tourist resorts.
Consequently,althoughintheorytheﬂowchartsummarizesdecisionswhichneedtobetakensequentially,
in practice more decisions are necessary to complete a single ﬂowchart pathway. The next section delves
more deeply into the ﬂowchart’s limitations and overcoming them.
4. Beyond the Flowchart
The ﬂowchart in Figure 1 provides only guidance. It does not and cannot pose all the pertinent questions
to understand deeply the dilemmas facing SIDS peoples, and those who would assist, in dealing with cli-
mate change linked-migration decisions. This section explores some on-the-ground considerations as well
as wider contexts for decision-making.
4.1. On-the-Ground Considerations
The ﬂowchart presents step-by-step decisions, but it is unclear regarding who would decide at each point
in the chain and who would pay for, direct/lead, monitor and enforce the decisions which are made. SIDS
do not have theﬁnancial resources to enact all decisions about climate change-linked migration.They also
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sometimes do not have the personnel with technical expertise to advise on the costs and feasibility of dif-
ferentpropositions,suchasbuildingislands,creatingﬂoatingislands,orworkingthroughinternationallaw.
Toft [2013] and Mattoo and Subramanian [2012] discuss dimensions of the argument that richer countries
who caused most of climate change should pay for supporting poorer countries, among which are SIDS,
in dealing with climate change and for eﬀecting any decisions. So far, little has happened outside of
fairly typical development assistance and development cooperation programs. More recent mechanisms
such as the Green Climate Fund [e.g., van Kerkhoﬀab etal., 2011; http://news.gcfund.org] and the Adap-
tation Fund [e.g., Horstmann, 2011; https://www.adaptation-fund.org] could support migration in theory,
but thus far, little has happened in practice. In one proposal from Egypt to the Adaptation Fund, the
response included the note “The Board has reservations supporting migration as an adaptation response”
(https://www.adaptation-fund.org/content/proposal-egypt-3). ADB [2012] summarizes possible ﬁnancial
mechanisms for dealing with climate change-linked migration, naming several international funds, sup-
porting more private sector involvement such as through insurance and encouraging supporting services
which reduce remittance costs.
Yet oﬀers from other countries have not been forthcoming for donating land where the islanders could
resettle or for unconditional visas or citizenship (whether or not SIDS peoples would want that). New
Zealand’s Paciﬁc Access Category for selected numbers of immigrants from Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Tonga is
toutedasanexampleofaprogramtoadmitclimatechange-linkedmigrants[AdgerandBarnett,2005;Pilkey
andYoung, 2009]. The oﬃcial material on this category (http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/
live/paciﬁcaccess) does not mention climate or related topics. That could change in the future, but the
category currently is for skilled, healthy immigrants to make a new life in New Zealand.
NewZealand’sinterestin“climaterefugees”hasbeentestedincourtandhasnotbeenaccepted.In2013,a
courtcasewasheardinNewZealandfromacitizenofKiribatiwhowasaimingtoclaimclimaterefugeesta-
tus.Twojudgments[Burson,2013;Priestley,2013]deniedthatstatustohim.In2014,aTuvaluancouplewas
granted residency in New Zealand due to numerous factors which included family and visa complications
aswellaspossibleadverseeﬀectsofclimatechangeonTuvalu,althoughthedecisionwasclearthatclimate
change could not be the only reason for accepting a speciﬁc applicant [Burson, 2014a]. That judgment was
issued on the same day that a Tuvaluan family’s appeal to stay in New Zealand for climate change reasons
was dismissed [Burson, 2014b].
Even if oﬀers—possibly competing oﬀers—were provided of land, citizenship, or other mechanisms, in
using the ﬂowchart for decision-making, diﬀerent community members and sectors might have diﬀer-
ent preferences. It is fairly straightforward to suggest that each individual who is legally an adult should
decideforthemselveswithfamiliesreconcilinganydiﬀerencesbythemselves.Thatapproachcouldleadto
on-the-ground diﬃculties for maintaining viable communities if diﬀerent groups make diﬀerent choices.
Tonga has a population of just over 100,000 people scattered across approximately three dozen islands. If
a country were to accept all Tongans due to climate change and a large proportion of the Tongan popula-
tion accepted the oﬀer, then it might not be feasible for the remaining population to continue running the
country. Public administration in small states is fraught with challenges [Baker, 1992] suggesting a thresh-
old below which it might not be feasible to provide full services because the staﬀ, resources and technical
expertisedonotexist.Muchmightdependonhowmanyofthenon-migrantshadtheskillsforandinterest
inrunningacountryaswellasthesupportprovidedtothoseremainingbehind.IfoldTongawerenolonger
viewed as a viable country due to climate change, then it might be diﬃcult to ﬁnd support for old Tonga
compared to ﬁnding support for the migrants and new Tonga. Permitting those who choose not leave to
liveouttheirlivesinadepopulatedcountrywhichisclosingdownisnotanoptimisticscenario.Conversely,
if only a small proportion of Tonga’s population accepted an oﬀer to create their own country on someone
else’s land, then that migrating population might not have the skills needed for setting up a country, even
though they wish to. Eventually, they might be forced to be aid-dependent, to assimilate, or to return.
Forcingcollectivemigrationornon-migrationdecisionsonacountry’spopulation,suchasthroughamajor-
ity vote or act of parliament, could run afoul of human rights regarding forced movement. No country or
territory has yet decided to move or not to move based on climate change. The decision-making ﬂowchart
doesnotrevealtheselegalcomplexitiesregardingwhomakesandimplementsthedecisions.Nonetheless,
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asmentionedabovewithrespecttoTakuuandtheCarteretIslandsinPapuaNewGuinea,casesareemerg-
ing where collective decision-making has been enacted and accepted for SIDS communities moving due
to climate change. Community members acceded to the collective process.
Questions remain regarding abandoned communities and islands. If an island country is entirely evacu-
ated, but the islands are submerged only at the highest tides, who owns the ﬁshing, mineral resource, and
shipping rights in the surrounding seas? Could those rights be sold or rented? Do the answers to those
questions change if a sovereign state is disbanded rather than re-created on new territory? Such questions
are just starting to be explored, but few answers emerge, with the lack of parallels and precedents (cf., the
Sovereign Military Order of Malta [Farran, 1954]) also inhibiting analysis. GerrardandWannier [2013] inves-
tigatethelegalintricaciesofterritorialconcerns,displacedpeoplesandlegalaccountabilityemergingfrom
low-lyingislandstateswhichmightneedtomoveduetoclimatechange.Theyprovideatoolkitofoptions,
but understandably, none can really be satisfactory for the aﬀected islanders, even if reality dictates that
these are the main options. Yamamoto and Esteban [2014] explore the availability and practicality of legal
optionsforlow-lyingislandstatesunderdiﬀerentclimatechangescenarios.Again,theoptionsareunpalat-
able yet could manifest in reality which means dealing with them.
These are the realities which must be dealt with on-the-ground, in addition to the hosts being respected
and being involved in decision-making. The decision-making ﬂowchart indicates little regarding the host
community’s input into or reactions to any migration decision and cannot oﬀer much regarding the con-
siderations raised in this section.
4.2. Contextualizing Decision-Making
The decision-making ﬂowchart needs to be further contextualized beyond on-the-ground considerations
in terms of understanding wider topics which emerge from the decision-making process, such as blame
and compensation. Not all SIDS peoples wish to give blame to others or to demand external resources.
Rudiak-Gould [2013] studied the Marshall Islands, describing the views and reactions of Marshallese to cli-
matechange.TheMarshallesegenerallyacceptthatclimatechangeisoccurring,thatitiscausedbyhuman
activitiesandthatsevereconsequencesfortheMarshallIslandsarelikely.Actionstoaddressclimatechange
are primarily assumed to be local; that is, implemented by Marshallese within the Marshall Islands. Impe-
tustoblameothersisuncommonandthereisnotextensiveinterestinmigratingelsewhereduetoclimate
change.Consequently,itseemslikelythatdecisionsmadeandimposedexternallycouldleadtofundamen-
tal disagreements and possibly lack of action for those decisions because that approach does not match
Marshallese culture and tradition.
TheviewfromtheMarshallIslandsthatmoralblameisnottobefoistedonexternalparties,despiteclimate
changebeingcausedbyoutsiders,leadstoanintriguingquestionaboutlegalblame.In2002,Tuvalu’sPrime
MinisterthreatenedacourtcaseagainsttheUSgovernmentunderGeorgeW.BushandtheAustraliangov-
ernment under John Howard for causing climate change because those leaders refused to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol [Jacobs, 2005]. The court case foundered when the Prime Minister was voted out of oﬃce. Similar
legalactionfromSIDSonthebasisofclimatechangehasnotyetbeenrepeated.GiventheMarshalleseview
onmoralblame,howrelevantforSIDSislegalblameforclimatechangeimpacts,includingpotentialforced
migration?
The blame game is further relevant in terms of determining the issues for which blame should be appor-
tioned. Should it be blame for causing climate change; for failing to deal with climate change; for the
political structures which prevent SIDS peoples from having the resources, choices and capabilities to deal
with climate change on their own; or a combination? Asking and answering these questions is beyond the
ﬂowchart’s mandate and capability.
Another limitation of the ﬂowchart is that the desired outcomes are not articulated. Is the end goal to save
asmanyindividuallivesaspossible,evenifthatmeansfullintegrationatthecostofsovereignty,anation,an
identity,oracommunity?Oristhegoaltomaintainthecoherenceofeachcommunity,eachSIDScultureand
eachidentity?—evenwhilerecognizingthatnocommunityiseverhomogeneous[Cannon,2007;Walmsley,
2006] and that culture by deﬁnition is dynamic [Krüger etal., 2015]. Are these two end goals necessarily
mutually exclusive? In several of the volcano-related evacuations cited above, many islanders returned to
their islands against the advice and desires of the authorities. The islanders wished to protect their assets,
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tomaintaintheirlivelihoodsandtoretaintheirownidentity,cultureandcontrolovertheirfates.Eveninthe
wake of a catastrophe, some islanders might refuse to leave.
These discussions about climate change-linked migration from SIDS occurs in the context of migration,
movementandmobilityatallscaleshavingalwaysbeen,andcontinuingtobe,alifeandlivelihoodstrategy
for SIDS peoples [Bedford and Hugo, 2012; Hau’ofa, 1993; King and Connell, 1999]. The situations described
here and the decision-making processes do not start with Box (a) in the ﬂowchart. Instead, a rich and long
background exists for the contemporary contexts, intertwining social change, environmental change and
a wide variety of responses to those changes including but not limited to mobility.
Throughout their history and continuing today, SIDS peoples have continually moved for numerous
environmental and social reasons. Examples are responding to short-term and long-term environmental
changes, responding to short-term and long-term social changes, pursuing education, joining family,
aiming for adventure and seeking diﬀerent livelihoods. The migration is sometimes entirely voluntary,
sometimes entirely forced and most frequently somewhere along the voluntary-forced continuum [Dick-
inson, 2009; Nunn etal., 2007]. Despite this long history and continuing phenomenon of migration by
SIDS peoples for various reasons, that is no justiﬁcation for forcing them to move due to contemporary
climate change. The key is having choices about if, when and how to migrate while having the resources
to successfully carry out the choices made on the SIDS’ own terms, again recognizing that SIDS are not
homogenous with a single viewpoint.
Attempting to conﬁne the decision-making process to a ﬂowchart from the SIDS’ perspective leaves open
the question about how diﬀerent standards and diﬀering perspectives would judge the decision-making
processandthedecisions.Ifexternalscience,forinstancetheIPCC [2013–2014],indicateswithhighagree-
ment and robust evidence that an island is severely and imminently threatened by climate change, but
the population decides to remain, then should that decision be respected and accepted by those exter-
nal to the community? If a community decides to move due to climate change’s potential damage, despite
no documented concern, would they deserve the same support as a community severely and imminently
threatened?
The ﬂowchart is presented as being for SIDS peoples for decision-making on their own terms, but aside
from a ﬂowchart not necessarily being the best format, decisions are not made in isolation. SIDS peoples’
decisions aﬀect others while views vary on desired outcomes and need for blame, among other moral and
legaltopics.Theﬂowchartcannotexpressoraddresspowerimbalances,moralstances,rights,orduties,nor
can it solve diﬀerences of opinion or impart the right to judge and enforce. The ﬂowchart helps to map out
fundamentaldecision-makingstepsandissueswhilepresentingevidenceandanalogies,butitslimitations
must be acknowledged.
5. Conclusions
AsSIDSpeoplesindicateinnumerousfora[Kelman,2010;McNamaraandGibson,2009],theyarenothappy
about the potential for forced migration linked to climate change. They recognize its potential for happen-
ing, so they request the power and resources to make decisions for themselves on their own terms. That
is rarely forthcoming. This paper has examined decision-making for climate change-linked migration from
SIDS, presenting a framework in the form of a decision-making ﬂowchart. The ﬂowchart indicates limita-
tions and opportunities of the decision-making process as well as gaps in providing SIDS peoples with the
decision-making power and resources which they desire and deserve.
Nevertheless, SIDS peoples are not a single group with a single view or single voice. That presents chal-
lengesandopportunitiesinformulatingandimplementingdecision-makingprocessesformigrationlinked
toclimatechange,whileacceptingthatsuchdecision-makingprocessesarenotremovedfromothersocial,
environmental and governance interactions. Rather than climate change and migration being completely
new threats or opportunities for SIDS, they and their nexus add to ongoing decisions which SIDS peoples
face regarding the future of their countries and cultures.
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